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ABSTRACT3
The selection process of proposals is a crucial component of scientific progress and innova-4
tions. Limited resources must be allocated in the most effective way to maximise advance-5
ments and the production of new knowledge, especially as it is becoming increasingly clear6
that technological and scientific innovation and creativity is an instrument of economic pol-7
icy and social development. The traditional approach based on merit evaluation by experts8
has been the preferred method, but there is an issue regarding to what extent such a method9
can also be an instrument of effective policy. This paper discuss some of the basic processes10
involved in the evaluation and selection of proposals, indicating some criterion for an optimal11
solution..12
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1. Introduction13
The selection process of scientific activities is usually performed by review of the merit14
and originality of the proposal. It is generally thought that such a competitive process will15
guarantee the emergence of the projects with the higher potential to offer new insights and16
produce more innovation. However, research is a very uncertain business and the ex-ante17
innovation potential may not be realised at all or achieved only partially. The evaluation18
procedures are obviously measuring only the potential of innovation and scientific advance19
and therefore are by definition affected by errors. Such errors are judgemental, cultural,20
numerical or simply social as they result from different school of thought or various factions21
in the scientific community. It is reasonable to ask if there is a ”best” strategy in the shaping22
of a research program to yield an optimal level of selection for the proposal that would take23
into account these uncertainties.24
A naive approach would simply use only the very top projects, but this choice would25
result in a reduced diversification of approaches and methods, thereby increasing the risk.26
On the other hand, accepting all projects will guarantee the maximum innovation, but it27
will be wasteful of resources and morally unacceptable because there will be no incentive to28
produce, sound, well-based proposals.29
Detailed analysis of project selection including asymmetric informations and outside30
choices have been performed (Bar and Gordon 2014)using highly sophisticated mathematical31
methods, but this short paper proposes to analyse this mechanism via a simple model of32
evaluation and project distribution, resulting in an understanding of the underlying mech-33
anism. The approach allows to estimates some optimal thresholds for maximising scientific34
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results and innovation.35
2. The model36
The various functions and distributions in this paper will be described in terms of the37
evaluation value, x, that is the score obtained via an ex-ante evaluation by a certain proposal,38
project or other forms of scientific documents as a result of a solicitation or a call for tender.39
The detailed evaluation procedure is not important here, but only that whatever score40
is used it must be a monotonic function of the implicit ”value” of the proposal. This is not41
such a strong restriction since any indicator of value should realise a consistent ranking of42
proposals.43
The density of proposals as a function of the score will be denoted by p(x) so that the44
number of proposal up to a certain score λ will be given by45
N(λ) =
1
N1
∫ λ
0
p(x) dx (1)
normalized by the total number of proposals,
N1 =
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx.
The distribution of projects with respect the score is very asymmetric. The estimated46
probability density obtained from real evaluation exercises (Fig.1) show that evaluations tend47
to cluster at a larger value than the average grade, with very small tails at high and low48
levels. The data here has been obtained from past evaluation results of the FP7 EU program49
(Barbante, 2015, Pers. Comm.) . Few projects score the maximum and few projects are50
indeed so bad to deserve the minimum score, as a result the distribution has a internal peaks.51
3
We can also describe the innovation content of a project with an innovation density v(x) ,
meaning that v(x) is the innovation content of a proposal with score x. The total innovation
of the proposals up a certain score is then given by the integral
I(λ) =
1
I0
∫ λ
0
v(x)p(x) dx
where a normalisation has been introduced so that the maximum value of innovation achiev-52
able with this particular set of proposals is one.53
The innovation content is an abstract quantity that indicate the amount of new results,
advancements or in general new science attained by the project. It is difficult to model such
function, but it seems that in order to have the evaluation process make any sense at all it
must be a growing function of the score x, possibly a very nonlinear function as we expect
that the best project will have a considerably larger potential than the rest. In this case we
can choose a simple behaviour:
v(x) = exp(αx) − 1
the scale α will give us the strength of increase with the increasing score. Fig.1 shows an54
example of such a density for α = 10.55
The shape of the project density function suggests that we can model it with a simple
function
p(x) = exp
(
−(x− x0)
2
σ
)
where x0 is the score at the peak of the distribution and σ is the width of the distribution.56
Fig.2 shows two examples together of the project density function and of the innovation57
density function.58
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3. The optimal choice59
A typical procedure would proceed to accept proposals starting from the maximum score
working down the list toward lower values, usually until funds are exhausted. The issue we
would like to investigate is if there is a way to determine a theoretical optimal choice (in
some sense) to choose the funding threshold , λ, such that proposals scoring higher than that
will be retained and the others declined. We can define the problem as follows: we need to
find the cut λ that gives the maximum total innovation I(λ) with the minimum number of
proposals. The total innovation for the proposal retained above the cut λ is therefore given
by
J1(λ) =
∫ 1
λ
p(x)v(x) dx
and the number of retained proposal is
NR(λ) =
1
N1
∫ 1
λ
p(x) dx
we would like to get the maximum innovation with the minimum of proposals, so the desired60
threshold λ is such that max(J1) and min(NR). We can observe however that the minimum61
of retained proposal is equivalent to maximising the number of declined proposals, so we can62
use the total number of declined proposals63
J2(λ) =
1
N1
∫ λ
1
p(x) dx
such that
min(NR) = min
(
1
N1
∫ 1
λ
p(x) dx
)
= max
(
1
N1
∫ λ
0
p(x) dx
)
= max(J2)
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and since J1 and J2 are positive, we can look for the maximum of a cost function J
J(λ) =
∫ 1
λ
p(x)v(x) dx +
∫ λ
0
p(x) dx
Fig.3 shows the behaviour of these functions. The total innovation is large when all64
projects are retained and because of the steep behaviour of the innovation density function65
the innovation is really all concentrated in the best projects, i.e. those scoring 0.7 and66
higher, as it is expected. The number of projects as a function of the threshold drops less67
rapidly as a consequence of the internal maximum of the density function. As a result the68
cost function has also an internal maximum. For the case in the picture the maximum total69
innovation with the minimum number of projects can be obtained with a score threshold of70
0.74, corresponding to retaining 26% of the projects.71
4. Sensitivity Tests72
Different behaviour of the innovation functions will fix the maximum innovation obtain-73
able from a given set of proposals, because the innovation is basically the overlap integral74
between the projects distribution and the innovation curve. Fig.4 shows the innovation for75
various values of the scale factor. As the innovation gets more concentrated towards the76
higher values of the score fewer and fewer project will contribute to the total innovation.77
Conversely, assuming a weaker dependence of the innovation on the score requires more78
projects to contribute to the totale innovation.79
By there same token, Fig.5 shows what happened for various project density functions.80
If the project density distribution is peaked at low values there will be a limited overlap and81
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a small total innovation is generated, whereas a distribution peaked toward high values will82
result in a large total innovation.83
We can get higher thresholds if we assume a faster increase of the innovation density with84
the score. Table 2 shows some results with different scales in the innovation function. The85
scale gives a measure of the gap between the best and the worst proposal. It is interesting86
to note that it is very difficult to get large rejection values, above 95%, corresponding to87
single digits success rates. This is quite reasonable for innovation that differs by orders88
of magnitude, but it is sub-optimal if there is a more uniform innovation values of the89
projects. It appears that for more moderate innovation densities values around 30% are more90
reasonable. Interestingly, these numbers corresponds to experimentally obtained values from91
the National Science Foundation (NSF 2014). In the period 2004-2013 the overall success92
rates for proposals, defined as the ratio between the proposal funded with respect to the93
total number of proposal presented, has always been higher than 20%, peaking at 32% in94
2009, decreasing to 22 − 24% in the following years. Disciplinary differences can be seen,95
GeoSciences peaked in 2009 at 45%, in the same year Social and Behavioural and Economics96
sciences reached 30% and Mathematics and Physics 40%. In Europe, the FP7 cooperation97
program yields a general success rate of 17%, averaged over the five years of the program98
and the environmental program in particular yielded a similar result (Helming et al. 2014).99
Statistics for the grants from the European Research Council are much lower. Success rates100
for Starting Grant from 2007 to 2014 were around 10%, Advanced Grant fared a little better101
around 13% (ERC Webpage, 2014).102
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5. Conclusion103
This simple model indicates that the selection process will yield optimal impacts only104
if the realistic distribution of the innovation potential is considered. The example from a105
realistic evaluation shows that the innovation potential, as it is measured by the score, is106
distributed into a larger portion of initiatives and ideas – i.e. proposals – that simply those107
scoring at the maximum level. As a consequence, optimal innovation can be reached only by108
accepting a wider range of proposals. Imposing very high thresholds, like in the ERC case,109
will have a sub-optimal impact.110
The model is a very simplified analysis that is of course missing cost considerations and111
more generally policy constraints and decisions that can affect the general mechanisms out-112
line here, but the main issue of having a mismatch of the value of the proposals and the113
implicit innovation potential looks fundamental. Unless, of course, we admit that the evalu-114
ation process is inaccurate and the scores do not reflect the innovation potential. Probably115
a scoring system that is not expressed in terms of continuous values, but is designed with116
categories as Certainly Reject, Certainly Accept, Accept with Reserve, for instance, would117
be less mechanistic and more in line with the ultimate policy goal to maximise innovation118
and production of knowledge. It is clear that a system with very low values of acceptance119
resembles a lottery system and though it is right to have an award system in place to rec-120
ognize exceptional achievements, it is doubtful it can be an effective instrument of policy.121
Nobel prizes can come after the research is done, but they are not the way to stimulate and122
encourage new research.123
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Center Threshold Retained Projects Innovation Obtained
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Scale α Threshold Retained Projects Innovation Obtained
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Fig. 1. The estimated distribution of scores from an FP7 evaluation exercise, superposed
to a theoretical innovation density curve.
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Fig. 2. The project density function and the innovation density functions, using x0 =
0.6, σ = 0.1 and α = 10
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Fig. 3. The total number of declined proposals, J2, the total innovation achieved, J1 and
the cost function J as a function of the threshold value λ. The case shown here is for a
project density function with x0 = 0.6, σ = 0.1 and for an innovation density function with
a scale α = 10.
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Fig. 4. Innovation density functions for α = 1, 5, 10, 20. A project density function (dashed
line) using x0 = 0.6, σ = 0.1 is also shown for reference
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Fig. 5. Project density functions using x0 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, σ = 0.1. An innovation density
with α = 10 (dashed line) is also shown for reference
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